THE NATURE OF LAW:PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN CONCEPTUAL JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL THEORY【2025|PDF|Epub|mobi|kindle电子书版本百度云盘下载】

THE NATURE OF LAW:PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN CONCEPTUAL JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL THEORYPDF格式电子书版下载

注意：本站所有压缩包均有解压码： 点击下载压缩包解压工具

PART 1 The Nature of Law: Positivism, Natural Law, and Ronald Dworkin1

CHAPTER ONE Classical Natural Law Theory2

A.Introduction2

B.Early Writings4

C.Criticisms of Classical Natural Law Theory22

D.An Alternative Interpretation of Natural Law Theory24

E.Suggested Readings27

CHAPTER TWO Early Positivism29

A.Introduction29

B.Early Positivism Defended31

C.Objections to the Command Theory41

D.Suggested Readings48

CHAPTER THREE Central Tenets of Modern Hartian Positivism50

A.Introduction50

B.The Relationship Between Law and Morality51

C.The Rule of Recognition as Defining Criteria of Legal Validity56

D.The Rule of Recognition as Social or Conventional Rule59

E.Suggested Readings67

CHAPTER FOUR Towards a “Third” Theory of Law: Dworkin’s Attack on Positivism68

A.Introduction68

B.The Rule of Recognition as Social Rule70

C.Judicial Discretion74

D.Suggested Readings90

CHAPTER FIVE Contemporary Natural Law Theories92

A.Introduction92

B.Procedural Natural Law Theory94

C.Neo-Classical Natural Law Theory105

D.Strong Natural Law Theory120

E.Suggested Readings127

CHAPTER SIX Dworkin’s Third Theory128

A.Introduction128

B.Suggested Readings166

CHAPTER SEVEN Law, Morality, and Conventional Criteria of Validity: Contemporary Positivism and Dworkin167

A.Introduction167

B.The Separability Thesis171

C.The Relationship Between the Content of the Rule of Recognition and the Social Practice192

D.What Kind of Convention Is the Rule of Recognition?195

E.Is the Rule of Recognition a Conventional Rule?235

F.Suggested Readings250

CHAPTER EIGHT Inclusive and Exclusive Legal Positivism252

A.Introduction252

B.Inclusive Legal Positivism254

C.Exclusive Legal Positivism262

D.Suggested Readings270

PART 2 Authority, Practical Guidance and the Possibility of Moral Criteria of Validity271

CHAPTER NINE Authority and the Possibility of Moral Criteria of Validity272

A.Introduction272

B.The Conceptual Impossibility of Moral Criteria of Validity275

C.Does Law Claim Legitimate Authority?285

D.Is the Preemption Thesis True?288

E.Is Razian Authority Really Incompatible With Moral Criteria of Validity?304

F.Suggested Readings311

CHAPTER TEN Practical Guidance and the Possibility of Moral Criteria of Validity313

A.Introduction313

B.The Incompatibility of Moral Criteria of Validity and the Practical Difference Thesis315

C.Inclusive Positivist Responses322

D.Suggested Readings333

PART 3 General Problems in the Conceptual Theory of Law: Obligation, Objectivity, and the Methodology of Conceptual Analysis335

CHAPTER ELEVEN The Problem of Legal Obligation336

A.Introduction336

B.Natural Law Solutions341

C.Positivist Solutions: The Command Theory349

D.Positivist Solutions: Hart’s Practice Theory359

E.Positivist Solutions: Obligation as a Point of View368

F.Suggested Readings389

CHAPTER TWELVE Legal Objectivity391

A.Introduction391

B.The Concepts of Objectivity, Legal Objectivity, and Legal Determi-nacy395

C.Different Questions About the Objectivity of Law411

D.Skeptical and Non-Skeptical Theories of Objectivity in Morality417

E.Skepticism About Determinacy and Objectivity in Law: Legal Realism and Critical Legal Studies437

F.Theories of Objectivity in Law453

G.Does It Matter Whether Law or Morality Is Objective?477

H.Suggested Readings483

CHAPTER THIRTEEN The Methodology Of Conceptual Analysis484

A.Introduction484

B.Descriptive Jurisprudence: The Project as Conceived by Hart and Austin488

C.An Explanation and Defense of Traditional Conceptual Analysis502

D.General Challenges to Traditional Descriptive Conceptual Analysis510

E.Normative Jurisprudence524

F.Naturalized Jurisprudence546

G.Skepticism About the Value of Conceptual Theorizing559

H.Suggested Readings565

INDEX567